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Giorgio Basta: A Short Summary of a Career1
※
Zoltán Péter Bagi
“Also, that was the time when the Turkish sultan, Mehmet,2 came to 
Nándorfehérvár; he moved with his armies over the Danube, came to Eger, 
conquered it and seized the castle; to the aid of which Sigismund Báthory 
rushed with the Transylvanian army.3 He came to the field of Keresztes, three 
miles from Eger and united with the army of the Holy Roman Emperor whose 
general was Maximilian, Prince of Austria;4 and they challenged the forces of 
the Emperor, but Eger hath been spent and in the succeeding battle the Turks 
hath defeated the Christians.”5 
This is how Ferenc Hidvégi Mikó, confidant of Gábor Bethlen, Prince of 
Transylvania summarized the events of 1596 in the Hungarian theatre of war. The 
loss of Eger and the defeat at Mezőkeresztes (October 22–26, 1596) were just as 
grievous as the military failures suffered in 1594 (the failed siege of Esztergom and 
1  The author received the Bolyai János Research Fellowship while working on this study 
(BO/00010/14/2).
2  Sultan Mehmed III (1595–1603).
3  Sigismund Báthory, prince of Transylvania (1588–1598, 1601–1603).
4  Archduke Maximilian Habsburg (1558–1618). 
5  “Szintén ez idő tájékán szultán Mehemet török császár kijövé Nándor-Fejérvárhoz; általköltözvén 
a Dunán, Eger alá jöve, megszállá, megvevé, a kinek segítségére az erdélyi haddal kimene Báthory Zsig-
mond a Keresztes mezejére, ki három mérföld Egerhez, megegyezvén a római császár hadával, kinek 
generálisa Maximilián ausztriai herczeg; megvívának a császár erejével, de már Eger elkölt vala, a harcz is 
succedála, mert megverék a törökök a keresztényeket.” Kazinczy, Gábor. Hidvégi Mikó Ferenc históriája. 
A maga életében történt erdélyi dolgokról, 1594–1613. Pest: Akadémia, 1863. 137–304, 141.
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the loss of Győr).6 In order to turn the tide, Rudolf II, Holy Roman Emperor and 
King of Hungary (1576–1612), requested his brother, Archduke Ernest of Austria 
(1553–1595), to send him personnel eligible to serve both as high-ranking military 
officers and as members of the War Council. The emperor even provided the names 
of those he wished to welcome to the Kingdom of Hungary: Jean T’Serclaes de 
Tilly7 (1559–1632) and a certain de la Motta. One day later he wrote another letter, 
this time without names.8 The Habsburg Court in Prague finally found the perfect 
candidate: he was a scholar and an experienced and able soldier, Count Karl von 
Mansfeld (1546–1595), who could also be appointed to the rank of lieutenant 
colonel general.9 
Besides Tilly, Mansfeld brought along two other soldiers who played significant 
roles in the history of the Fifteen Years’ War (the Long Turkish War) in the 
Hungarian theatre of war: Adolf von Schwarzenberg (1551–1600)10 and Hermann 
Christoph von Russworm (1565–1605).11 During the negotiations in Brussels, the 
Count also proposed to put other individuals of considerable military expertise 
on the emperor’s payroll, including Giorgio Basta. At the time, however, Rudolf II 
refused to employ him, because Alessandro Verlin, who was also participating in the 
negotiations, opined that since the Kingdom of Spain was preparing for war with 
Henry IV of France (1589–1610), it would be inexpedient to rob Philip II of Spain 
6  Eger fell on October 13, 1596. The castle of Eger was strategically important, because whoever 
held it could control and defend the road connecting Buda and Transylvania. Baranyai Decsi János 
magyar históriája (1592–1598). Translated by Péter Kulcsár. Budapest: Helikon, 1982. 325; Tóth, Sán-
dor László. A mezőkeresztesi csata és a tizenöt éves háború. Szeged: Belvedere Meridionale, 2000. 189; 
Kelenik, József. ‘A mezőkeresztesi csata’, In Fegyvert s vitézt… A magyar hadtörténet nagy csatái, edited 
by Róbert Hermann. Budapest: Corvina, 2003. 111–129, 114.
7  Junkelmann, Marcus. “Der Du gelehrt hast meine Hände den Krieg.” Tilly. Heiliger oder Kriegsver-
brecher? Altötting: Geiselberger, 2007; Saller, Rudolf. Reichsgraf Johann T’Serclaes von Tilly. Altötting: 
Geiselberger, 2007.
8  Hatvani (Horváth), Mihály. Magyar történelmi okmánytár a brüsseli országos levéltárból és a bur-
gundi könyvtárból. III. kötet (1553–1608). Pest: Eggenberger, 1859. 61.
9  Istvánffy Miklós Magyarok dolgairól írt históriája. Tállyai Pál XVII. századi fordításában. Pub-
lished by Péter Benits. Reprint, Budapest: Balassi, 2009. 195; Bagi, Zoltán Péter. ‘Karl von Mansfeld és 
a tizenöt éves háború.’ In Az oszmán–magyar kényszerű együttélés és hozadéka, edited by Zsuzsanna J. 
Újváry. Piliscsaba: PPKE BTK, 2013. 287–302. 
10  Schwarzenberg, Karl. Geschichte der reichsständischen Hauses Schwarzenberg. Neustadt an der 
Aisch: Degener, 1963. 104–107; Pálffy Géza – Perger, Richard. ‘A magyarországi török háborúk részt-
vevőinek síremléke Bécsben (16–17. század).’ Fons 5, no. 2 (1998): 207–264, 245–246.
11  Janko, Wilhelm Edlen. ‘Der k. k. Feldmarschall Christoph Hermann von Russworm. Ein Bei-
trag zur Kenntniss der Regierungsperiode, Cultur- und Sittengeschichte unter Kaiser Rudolph II.’ 
 Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift 10, no. 4 (1869): 30–53, 181–210; Stauffer, Albrecht. Her-
mann Christoph Graf von Rusworm kaiserlicher Feldmarschall in den Türkenkämpfen unter Rudolf II. 
München: Ackerman, 1884.
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(1556–1598) of the invaluable insight of these commanders.12 Thus, the Habsburg 
emperor offered no employment to Basta in that year. 
However, the fiascos of 1596, especially the poor performance of the senior 
officers in the last phase of the Battle of Mezőkeresztes, prompted the emperor to 
once again request abler commanders from the Habsburg Netherlands.13 A letter 
written by Rudolf II on February 15, 1597 in Prague reveals that Archduke Albrecht 
(1559–1621), governor of the Spanish provinces of the Habsburg Netherlands, 
called his relative’s attention to several individuals, whereupon the Prague Court 
12  Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Kriegsarchiv (ÖStA KA) Alte Feldakten (AFA) 1595/4/ad3g.
13  Kelenik, ‘A mezőkeresztesi csata’, 127.
Giorgio Basta (1550–1607) Engraving by Dominicus Custos 
in 1604 (Österreichische Nationalbibliothek)
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decided to choose Basta.14 So started the Hungarian and Transylvanian career of 
Basta, one of the cruellest and most dreaded Habsburg senior officers in the history 
of Hungary. 
The major turning points in Giorgio Basta’s life and career (1544–1607)
Giorgio Basta was born in a village called Ulpino in Monferrato Province in 1544.15 
His father, an Albanian nobleman named Demetrius Basta from the historical 
region of Epirus, had served the king of Spain. In 1542 he had been ordered to go 
to Piemont with his stratioti16 in order to fight with the army of the king of France. 
There he had met Magdolna Rosini, an aristocratic lady from Alessandria, and had 
married her. They had then had a son called Giorgio, who was raised in Asti until the 
age of 14, when he discontinued his studies as the king ordered Demetrius Basta to 
go to the Habsburg Netherlands. The son soon followed his father to his new post to 
learn the military profession. 
Giorgio Basta steadily climbed the army’s career ladder, as one might put it today. 
As he proudly stated in the preface of his own work, the Gouuerno della Caualleria, 
he started as a simple private.17 He acquired his strategic skills in the war between 
the Spanish crown and the Provinces of the Habsburg Netherlands as well as in the 
French wars of religion as a supporter of the Catholic League. He fought under the 
command of such famous officers as Fernando Álvarez de Toledo y Pimentel, Duke 
of Alba (1507–1582), Don Juan d’Austria (1547–1578), Alessandro Farnese, Duke 
of Parma (1545–1592), and the already mentioned Karl von Mansfeld. 
Basta’s name first appears in the sources in July 1568; at the time he fought under 
the leadership of his father in the army sent to siege Bergen op Zoom. Following the 
death of Demetrius Basta (1571) he joined as deputy commander the company of 
stratioti led by his brother, Nicolo. He fought in the battles of Langenstraten (1572), 
Mook (1574) and Gembloux (1578), but also participated in the sieges of Antwerp 
(1576, 1584) and Hulst (1589, 1596) and in the attacks against Bonn (1588), 
Noyon (1593) and Calais (1596). In recognition of his merits the king of Spain 
promoted him to higher and higher ranks. 
14  Hatvani, Magyar történelmi okmánytár, 86–87.
15  According to Schweigerd Basta was born on January 30, 1550, in the village of La Rocca close 
to Taranto. Schweigerd, Carl A. Oesterreichs Helden und Heerführer von Maximilian bis auf die neueste 
Zeit. Erster Band. Zweite Periode. Wien: Comptoire, 1857. 593–599, 593; Bălcescu writes that he had 
indeed been born in La Rocca, but in 1547 rather than in 1544. Bălcescu, Nicolae. A románok Vitéz 
Mihály idején. Translated by János V. András. Bukarest: Irodalmi Kiadó, 1963. 315.
16  On the stratiota light cavalry, see B. Szabó, János. A honfoglalóktól a huszárokig. A középkori 
Magyar könnyűlovasságról. Budapest: Argumentum, 2010. 139–140.
17  Basta, Giorgio. Gouuerno della Caualleria, Das ist, Bericht von Anführung der leichten Pferde… 
Frankfurt: de Bry, 1614.
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In the late 1570s or early 1580s he was already the captain of a company of 
harquebusiers; later, he commanded a lancer unit. He was the commissary general of 
the cavalry of Karl von Mansfeld’s army sent to siege Hulst in 1589. The following 
year Alessandro Farnese, who had invaded France, appointed him to lead a 500-strong 
light cavalry unit, whilst in 1592 he was promoted to the position of commander 
general of the Spanish cavalry, which was sent to the French theatre of war. It was 
with the aid of 800 cavalrymen and through the surrounding moorland that he 
threw provisions into La Fère which had been besieged by Henry IV for four years. 
In reward, he obtained the title of baron from the king of Spain in 1596. Further, he 
was made the landlord of Sult in Flanders and the governor of the Gelderland in the 
Habsburg Netherlands.
Basta abandoned a promising career in the Habsburg Netherlands when, on 
April 29, 1597, he entered the service of Emperor Rudolf II as the lieutenant field 
marshal of the main imperial-royal army (General Obrist-Feldmarschall-leutnandt).18 
In the same year he participated in military operations in Hungary.19 At the onset of 
winter he travelled to Prague and in the new year he planned to return to his home 
in the Habsburg Netherlands. The emperor, however, wanted to retain his services, 
and, as a token of his confidence, he made Basta the Knight of the Golden Spur 
(February 16, 1598). Basta was also given the rank of General of the Light Cavalry 
(General über die geringe Reiterei). Basta accepted the new title and the rank, since 
in the previous year it was him who requested the emperor to grant him those.20 The 
Hofkriegsrat even allowed him an escort of one hundred Walloon harquebusiers.21 
By the emperor’s grace he could also make a three-month visit to his home in the 
Netherlands.
Upon his return to Vienna he found that in his absence the relations in the Court 
had changed considerably. The emperor had appointed Adolf von Schwarzenberg 
the field marshal22 of the new campaign, under whose leadership, however, Basta 
refused to serve. Thus instead of becoming commander of the light cavalry he was 
18  For more on this rank, see Bagi, Zoltán Péter. A császári-királyi mezei hadsereg a tizenöt éves 
háborúban. Hadszervezet, érdekérvényesítés, reformkísérletek. Budapest: Históriaantik, 2011. 65–73.
19  Dilich, Wilhelm. Ungarische Chronica, darinnen ordentliche, eigentliche, kurtze beschreibungen 
des Ober und Nieder Ungern, beneben seinen Landtaffeln ... Cassel: Wessel, 1606. 307–308; Hatvani, 
Magyar történelmi okmánytár, 88; Kazinczy, Gábor. Illésházy István nádor följegyzései 1592–1603. 
Pest: Akadémia, 1863. 49–50; Horváth, Mihály. Magyarország történelme. IV. kötet, Pest: Heckenast, 
1871. 452; Benda, Kálmán. ‘Giovanni Marco Isolano gróf ezredes feljegyzése a magyarországi török 
háborúról 1594–1602.’ Hadtörténelmi Közlemények 30, no. 4 (1983): 651–681, 663; Tóth, Sándor 
László. ‘A vác–verőcei csata (1597. november 2–9.).’ Hadtörténelmi Közlemények 102, no. 1 (1989): 
14–42; Tóth, A mezőkeresztesi csata és a tizenöt éves háború, 265–283; Istvánffy Magyarok dolgairól írt 
históriája, 233, 283–285.
20  ÖstA KA, Hofkriegsrat (HKR) Protokolle (Pr.) Registratur Band 199. Fol. 12v. No. 17.
21  ÖStA KA Bestallungen (Best.) No. 561.
22  ÖStA KA AFA, 1598/7/4.
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appointed master of ordnance, responsible for the control and provisioning of the 
artillery units (General Obrist-Zeugmeister).23 In August he received the post of field 
marshal of the army ordered to escort Archduke Maximilian, who was to take over 
as the governor of Transylvania.24 This army was sent against the main Ottoman 
army led by Saturci Mehmed that besieged the castle of Várad in eastern Hungary 
(September 29–November 3, 1598).25 On two occasions Basta attempted to provide 
resupply for the defenders of the castle to no avail. Finally, the Ottoman army failed 
to capture Várad and retreated undisturbed.26
In 1598 Basta’s life and career became strongly intertwined with the fate of Upper 
Hungary and Transylvania, since the emperor appointed him acting commander 
in chief of Upper Hungary (Verwalter des Feldoberstamtes in Oberungarn).27 The 
Transylvanian events of 1599 and Cardinal András Báthory’s28 seizing the throne 
resulted in a political constellation that proved to be rather unfavourable for the 
new Habsburg Court in Prague. Rudolf II therefore ordered Basta to cooperate with 
Michael the Brave, Voivode of Wallachia29 (1593–1600), and to overthrow with a 
joint attack the power of the cardinal-prince who sought to make peace with both 
the High Porte and the Habsburg Court whilst maintaining strong ties in Poland. 
However, no money or soldiers were provided to aid Basta, so he could not 
embark on any significant military enterprise. Consequently, on October 28, 1599 
the Wallachian–Cossack–Székely army of Michael the Brave defeated András 
Báthory’s forces at Sellenberk (Șelimbăr, present-day Romania) without Basta’s 
help.30 Upon receiving news of the battle, the sickly Basta set out for Transylvania 
23  ÖStA KA HKR Pr. Expedit Band 200 Fol. 13r. No. 75.
24  ÖStA KA AFA, 1598/8/13; Kazinczy, Illésházy István nádor följegyzései, 56; Benda, ‘Giovanni 
Marco Isolano gróf ezredes feljegyzése’, 666.
25  In May 1598, an army of 9,600 men was put together for Archduke Maximilian who had been 
appointed governor of Transylvania. Half of this army was made up of riders and infantry hired on the 
tax voted by the Silesian and Moravian estates. ÖStA KA AFA, 1598/5/ad 5.
26  Hatvani, Magyar történelmi okmánytár, 106–107; Benda, ‘Giovanni Marco Isolano gróf ezredes 
feljegyzése’, 666; Istvánffy Magyarok dolgairól írt históriája, 312, 317.
27  ÖStA KA AFA, 1599/9/2; Benda, ‘Giovanni Marco Isolano gróf ezredes feljegyzése’, 667; 
Pálffy, Géza. ‘Kerületi és végvidéki főkapitányok és főkapitány-helyettesek Magyarországon a 16–17. 
században.’ Történelmi Szemle 39, no. 2 (1997): 257–288, 273.
28  On András Báthory’s life, see Horn, Ildikó. Báthory András. Budapest: Új Mandátum, 2002.
29  Bălcescu, A románok Vitéz Mihály idején.
30  Meurer, Theodor. Theodori Meurers relationis historicae continuatio, oder warhafftige Beschrei-
bung aller fürnemen und gedenckwürdigen Historien. Wahrhaftige Beschreibung aller vornehmen und 
gedenkwürdigen Historien. Franckfurt, M.: Latomus, 1600. 28; Hatvani, Magyar történelmi okmány-
tár, 135; Kővári, László. Erdély történelme. III. kötet, Pest–Kolozsvár: Ráth–Stein, 1860. 89–99; Ka-
zinczy, Illésházy István nádor följegyzései, 75–78; Szilágyi, Sándor. Erdélyország története tekintettel 
művelődésére. II. kötet. Pest: Heckenast, 1866. 4–6; Szádeczky, Lajos. Erdély és Mihály vajda története 
1595–1601, Oklevéltárral. Temesvár: Csanád-egyházmegyei Könyvsajtó, 1893. 54–112; Bălcescu, A 
románok Vitéz Mihály idején, 243–313; Szamosközy, István. Erdély története (1598–1599, 1603). Bu-
dapest: Európa, 1981. 218–275; Benda, Kálmán. Bocskai István. Budapest: Századvég, 1993. 80; Tóth, 
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where he was met with the suspicion of the Hungarian estates and with the jealousy 
of the Romanian voivode. In order to somewhat restrict the power of Michael the 
Brave, Basta left German and Hungarian garrisons in Huszt (Хуст, present-day 
Ukraine), Somlyó and Hadad (Hodod, present-day Romania), and then marched 
to Kassa (Košice, present-day Slovakia) in March 1600. On his way he wrote several 
reports on how the Romanian voivode had abused his power.31 These reports – 
the news of the policy Michael the Brave pursued towards the High Porte and the 
Transylvanian nobility’s requests for help – finally sufficed to convince the Prague 
Court that the Romanian voivode had to be eliminated.
In August 1600, Michael the Brave summoned his loyal Rascian, Wallachian, 
Cossack and Székely troops to the town of Szászsebes (Sebeș, present-day Romania). 
Basta, the captain general of Upper Hungary, set out in early September to 
Transylvania to aid those opposed to the voivode. On September 4 at Torda (Turda, 
present-day Romania), he joined forces with István Csáky, leader of the Transylvanian 
nobles’ army, and four days later this army defeated the forces of Michael the Brave at 
the village of Miriszló (Mirăslău, present-day Romania).32 
A mezőkeresztesi csata és a tizenöt éves háború, 388–399; Horn, Báthory András, 220, 228; Istvánffy 
Magyarok dolgairól írt históriája, 319; Bethlen, Farkas. Erdély története. V. kötet, Báthory Zsigmond 
lemondásától Mihály vajda hatalomra kerüléséig (IX–X. könyv.) Translated by Péter Kasza. Notes by 
Tamás Kruppa. Budapest: Enciklopédia, 2010. 127, 138–139.
31  Meurer, Theodori Meurers relationis historicae continuatio, 59; Hatvani, Magyar történelmi 
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The victory, however, failed to solve the problems in Transylvania for Basta 
and the Prague Court; on the contrary, it appeared to have created even more. The 
estates opposing the voivode were divided into three parties and their opinions were 
divided as to the next steps. The party led by Gáspár Kornis urged the acceptance 
of Habsburg rule and proposed Archduke Maximilian as the candidate for the 
throne. The supporters of Báthory led by Moses Székely (1553–1603) pressed for 
the free election of the prince and wanted to recall Sigismund Báthory. The third 
party, followers of István Csáky, sought an intermediary solution: they wished to 
remain loyal to Rudolf but demanded to be allowed to freely elect the prince. Basta’s 
situation further worsened when he had no choice but to dismiss his troops whose 
wages he could not pay; therefore, the Transylvanian estates who feared retribution 
from Michael the Brave and from the Porte, found that the enthronement of 
Sigismund for the third time would be the most acceptable solution as Báthory 
also enjoyed the support of Poland. The general Diet of Transylvania convened in 
early 1601 in Kolozsvár (Cluj, present-day Romania) once again elected Sigismund 
Báthory as prince of Transylvania.33 Basta, who was nominated the governor of 
Transylvania (Gubernator in Siebenbürgen) in the meantime, had no choice but to 
leave the country.34
Rudolf II refused to accept the loss of Transylvania. Upon hearing the news of 
Sigismund’s enthronement, Rudolf decided that Michael the Brave, who had taken 
refuge in his Court, should once again enjoy his royal favour. What is more, he 
provided one hundred thousand Rhenish guilders for him to enlist soldiers and join 
Basta’s forces. The emperor opined that Transylvania belonged to the Habsburgs 
while the Romanian voivode as a vassal could possess Wallachia. 
In early July 1601, Voivode Michael and his eight thousand soldiers joined Basta’s 
forces at Majtény (Majcichov, present-day Slovakia). On July 24 their army invaded 
Transylvania and, on August 3, 1601, defeated Sigismund’s forces at Goroszló 
(Guruslău, present-day Romania). After the victory Basta also settled accounts 
‘Giovanni Marco Isolano gróf ezredes feljegyzése’, 671; Újváry, Zsuzsanna. „Nagy két császár birodalmi 
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with Michael the Brave: on the pretext of treason and the plunder of his soldiers he 
ordered his Walloons to murder him in the encampment of Torda on August 19.35
As the governor of Transylvania, Basta once again strengthened the country’s 
loyalty to the emperor, although Sigismund and his followers refused to relinquish 
control over Transylvania. The fallen prince returned in September 1601, and this 
time he was backed by the Porte. Supported by the rest of his faithful followers and 
aided by the Turkish and Tatar troops that were invading Transylvania, he attacked 
Basta who, lacking a sufficient army, withdrew to the Kingdom of Hungary. 
By the end of the year a rather strange situation had arisen. Sigismund had 
occupied Gyulafehérvár (Alba Julia, present-day Romania) and the Saxon cities 
but had not managed to conquer the high walls of Kolozsvár. On the other hand, 
Basta had gained a foothold in Northern Transylvania and had occupied one castle 
after the other: Gyalu, Nagyalmás, Bethlenvár and Beszterce all fell (Gilău, Almașu 
Mare, Beclean, Bistrița; present-day Romania).36 On February 15, 1602, the two 
parties agreed to an armistice based on the status quo. During the negotiations Basta 
supported Radu Şerban (1601, 1602–1610), pretender of Wallachia, and gave him 
troops to occupy the province. In March 1602, however, the enterprise fell through. 
Since Basta did not have enough money or soldiers to continue the fight, through 
the mediation of István Csáky he forced Sigismund Báthory to leave via diplomatic 
means. 
The supporters of Báthory led by Moses Székely refused to accept that Prince 
Báthory had relinquished the throne and that Transylvania was lost to the Habsburgs. 
Basta was forced to engage them in battle at Tövis (Teiuș, present-day Romania) on July 
2, 1602. Following his victory in the battle, Basta could take possession of Transylvania. 
35  Dilich, Ungarische Chronica, 333–334; Pethő, Rövid magyar kronica, 150; Krauss, ‘Tractatus 
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gróf ezredes feljegyzése’, 675–676; Magyar História 1526–1608, edited by Gábor Nagy. Debrecen: 
Tóth, 1998. 355–357; Istvánffy Magyarok dolgairól írt históriája, 389–390.
Zoltán Péter Bagi44
Besides securing the country for the Habsburgs, he attempted again to seize Wallachia 
and this time he succeeded: Radu Şerban was enthroned in August 1602.37
As captain general of Transylvania Basta was further pestered by Moses Székely 
and the dissatisfied estates of the country. While he was conducting negotiations 
with the latter, Székely received permission (ahdname) from the Sultan to seize the 
throne.38 Furthermore, in the spring of 1603, the High Porte ordered a rather large 
Turkish–Tatar army led by Bektash, Beylerbey of Temesvár (Timișoara, present-day 
Romania), to aid the meagre forces of Székely. 
The campaign that started in early April proved to be fruitful: Lugos (Lugoj, 
present-day Romania), Karánsebes (Caransebeș, present-day Romania) and 
Gyulafehérvár, where Székely had himself elected prince of Transylvania, fell in 
quick succession. Basta was once again doomed to helplessly watch the advance of 
the Transylvanian–Turkish–Tatar army, because he had too few soldiers. He could 
not expect help from either Prague or Radu; therefore, he and his retinue escaped to 
the Kingdom of Hungary. Székely was left alone and by mid-summer he had gained 
control over the entire country. 
Although Radu feared that the voivode of Moldavia would launch an attack 
against him, in early July his forces marched out of Wallachia and defeated the army 
of Prince Moses and Bektash at Brassó (Brașov, present-day Romania) on July 17, 
1603. After the victory, Basta took possession of Transylvania in the name of the 
emperor for the third time. For this act he received the castle of Huszt and the title 
of lord-lieutenant of Máramaros county (Maramureș, present-day Romania) from 
Rudolf II. (Basta had held the title of Count of Huszt from April 1602.)39
Having worn down the resistance of the estates, Basta could start to organize 
the Habsburg-style administration of Transylvania. At the Diet that opened at Déva 
37  Dilich, Ungarische Chronica, 341–342; Krauss, ‘Tractatus Rerum tam Bellicarum’, 181–182; Bor-
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(Deva, present-day Romania) on September 9, 1603, Basta suspended the feudal 
constitution of Transylvania. He made all the participants adopt a decree which 
stipulated that the entire fortune of those absent from the Diet and of those who fell 
on the side of Székely in the Battle of Brassó was to be confiscated. The noblemen 
who were present were pardoned if they paid one quarter of their fortune in cash 
money to the emperor. The disloyal cities had to reconvert to Catholicism, and they 
had to pay remarkably high tributes to the emperor.
Basta ensured the systematic implementation of the retributory decrees 
adopted at the Diet of Déva. He retained the title of governor but was aided by a 
Governing Council of 10. Five of the members came from abroad; the other five 
were Transylvanians loyal to the Habsburgs. The Council executed the orders of 
the Prague Court. Basta nominated strangers to exercise control over the castles, 
towns, counties and the seats and started to persecute the Protestants. The Diet no 
longer fulfilled its previous functions; at the Kolozsvár assembly ( January 25, 1604) 
the participants were only required to vote in favour of the new taxes. The towns 
that had been pronounced disloyal, lost their right to self-administration and had 
to pay considerable fines to the emperor: Brassó was liable to make a payment of 
50,000 and Kolozsvár a payment of 70,000 Rhenish guilders. The country, however, 
lost more than its independence and self-rule: four Transylvanian counties in the 
northwest were annexed to the Kingdom of Hungary and came under the military 
and political control of Giorgio Basta.40
The emperor appointed Governor Basta as field marshal of the main imperial-
royal army in April 160441 and as lieutenant colonel general (General Obristleutnant) 
for Matthias, Archduke of Austria. In these capacities, Basta successfully defended 
the castle of Esztergom against the army of Grand Vizier Lala Mehmed from 
September 18, 1604 to October 12, 1604.42 In the final months of the year, however, 
40  ‘Maros-vásárhelyi Nagy Szabó Ferencz memoriáléja.’ 84–91; Kővári, Erdély történelme, 152–
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he did not fight the Ottoman army, but turned against the Hajduks of Bocskai in 
an attempt to crush the uprising that had broken out in October against Rudolf II. 
Basta defeated Bocskai’s forces at Osgyán (Ožďany, present-day Slovakia) on 
November 17, 1604 and at Edelény (November 25–28, 1604). Due to his small army 
and complete lack of artillery, he failed to occupy Kassa (December 3–5, 1604)43 
and then retreated to the army’s winter quarters in the Eperjes (Prešov, present-day 
Slovakia) area.44 With his infantry regiments and the cavalry he left Szepes county 
(Spiš, present-day Slovakia) in April 1605 and concentrated his troops at Pozsony 
(Bratislava, present-day Slovakia) in the fortifications prepared for Vienna’s defence.45
Even though Basta received further decorations, the aging and sickly commander 
was no longer reckoned with at the Court. Even his Walloon cavalry were taken away 
from him and were disbanded.46 Basta wished to overcome his financial difficulties 
by accepting a commission of the Holy See, since Pope Paul V wanted Basta in his 
army. On February 26, 1607, the parties signed the contract, and Rudolf II also 
agreed to release Basta from his service when Venice made peace with the Papal 
states, as Basta’s services would no longer be required. The physically and morally 
shaken Basta suffered a fatal stroke on November 20, 1607.47
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Basta, the commander47
In his book The Mask of Command, English historian John Keegan listed five duties 
that commanders were to consider and perform if they wished to successfully prepare 
and conduct their campaigns.48 We will analyse Giorgio Basta’s skills and activity 
as a commander through two of Keegan’s aspects, the imperative of action and the 
imperative of example.
Action based on knowledge and forethought
In his letter of October 4, 1604, Giovanni Stefano Ferreri, the papal nuncio in 
Prague, wrote to Cardinal Pietro Aldobrandini that it was in Basta’s nature to 
never risk the success of his enterprises and the lives of his soldiers.49 In another 
contemporary work Gáspár Vojti Veres commended the acts of Gábor Bethlen and 
remarked that in the Battle of Edelény, Bethlen as captain of the vanguard had fought 
with “Commander Giorgio Basta, who was cunning rather than belligerent”.50 In my 
opinion these two descriptions are the briefest and most concise summary of Basta’s 
expertise and military skills. Ferreri’s letter reveals Basta’s cautiousness and foresight 
and highlights that he sought to execute all his tasks in a manner that allowed him to 
spare the lives of his few soldiers. 
The military art of the era held that the best defence against the greater numbers 
and larger cavalry of the enemy was to build ramparts and trenches. Basta fought in 
the Netherlands and in France and was therefore familiar with these new tactical 
approaches, as shown by the following excerpt from Miklós Istvánffy’s work on the 
Battle of Vác–Verőce (November 2–9, 1597). 
47  Kepner, Johann Friedrich. Thaten und Charakterzüge berühmter österreichischer Feldherren. 
Erster Band, erste Abtheilung. Wien: Degen, 1808. 118–122; Schweigerd, Oesterreichs Helden und
Heerführer, 593–599; Veress, Endre. Basta György levelezése és iratai I. (1597–1602). Budapest: MTA 
Könyvkiadó Hivatala, 1909; Veress, Endre. Basta György levelezése és iratai II. (1602–1607). Buda-
pest: MTA Könyvkiadó Hivatala, 1913; Pálffy–Perger, ‘A magyarországi török háborúk résztvevőinek 
síremléke Bécsben’, 213–215.
48  Keegan, John. A parancsnoklás álarca. Budapest: Európa, 2011. passim. [Translator’s note: The 
English language version used for the purpose of translation: Keegan, John. The Mask of Command. 
New York: Penguin Books, 1988.]
49  ‘Die Prager Nuntiatur des Giovanni Stefano Ferreri und die Wiener Nuntiatur des Giacomo 
Serra (1603–1605).’ In Nuntiaturberichte aus Deutschland siebzehntes Jahrhundert, edited by Arnold 
Oskar Meyer. Berlin: Bath, 1913. 234; Veress, Basta György levelezése II, XXIV.
50  “Básta Györggyel, az inkább fortélyos, semmint harcias vezérrel.” Bojti Veres, ‘A nagy Bethlen Gá-
bor viselt dolgairól’, 49–50.
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“And Maximilian also deemed it would happen beyond doubt and thus ceased 
to surround the encampment with ramparts, trenches and carriages from all 
sides and, taking heed of Giorgio Basta, he had four fortifications erected on 
the higher ground to defend the encampment and filled those with artillery 
and German, Italian, French and Magyar infantry; following the example of 
Count Karl Mansfeld who also erected such fortifications at suitable locations 
and by that he had gained victory when occupying the castle of Esztergom.”51 
Basta later also made use of ramparts and fortifications when he deemed them 
necessary. He applied this principle before the Battle of Miriszló when, fearing the 
swift attacks of Voivode Mihály’s Cossacks, he had ramparts erected and placed 
part of his infantry and artillery within them.52 In a similar fashion, he ordered his 
soldiers to erect a strong rampart at Dés (Dej, present-day Romania) when he was 
outnumbered by Sigismund Báthory’s army invading Transylvania in the autumn 
of 1601. He left sufficient forces to defend the rampart and he retreated toward 
Szatmár.53 Mikó Hidvégi mentioned in his memoirs after the Battle of Brassó that 
Basta and his army marched to Lippa (Lipova, present-day Romania) where the 
commander had such strong ramparts erected that the Ottomans had no chance to 
break through.54 In the Hungarian theatre of war he erected ramparts to actively 
defend Esztergom,55 which proved very useful for the defenders of the castle.56 Basta 
also had earthworks erected at Eperjes and Pozsony to protect the town and the 
fortification against Bocskai’s Hajduks.57
Not only did the commander make wide use of these defence structures, but he 
also advised others to erect such fortifications. We know from Illésházy’s notes that 
in 1602 Basta “reasoned with Voivode Radul not to engage in battle with the Tatars, 
as they, together with the Poles and Moldavians were a hundred thousand strong, but 
51  “S Maximilián is kétség nélkül azt következni ítélvén, az tábort sánccal s árokkal és szekerekkel 
mindenfelől környűlfogni megszűnék, és Basta György intéséből négy kastélyt az magosabb hegyecs-
kéken az tábor oltalmazására csináltatni, s lövőszerszámokat beléjek vonyatván megerősítteté, s német, 
olasz, francia s magyar gyalogokot helyhezteti beléjük; hasznos példát vévén gróf Mansfeld Károlytól, 
kitől emlékeznek vala, hogy olyan kastélyok illendő helyeken való csinálásával Esztergom megszállása-
kor győzedelmet nyert légyen.” Istvánffy Magyarok dolgairól írt históriája, 283–284; Kazinczy, Illésházy 
István nádor följegyzései, 49–50.
52  Bălcescu, A románok Vitéz Mihály idején, 385; Bethlen, Erdély története, 259.
53  ‘Maros-vásárhelyi Nagy Szabó Ferencz memoriáléja.’ 62; Kővári, Erdély történelme, 123; Ka-
zinczy, Hidvégi Mikó Ferenc históriája, 153; Szamosközi István történeti maradványai, 137; Ortelius, 
Chronologia oder Historische Beschreibung aller Kriegsempörungen und Belagerungen in Ungarn, 213r.; 
Istvánffy Magyarok dolgairól írt históriája, 391.
54  Kazinczy, Hidvégi Mikó Ferenc históriája, 24.
55  Dilich, Ungarische Chronica, 371.
56  Szamosközi István történeti maradványai, 256.
57  Pethő, Rövid magyar kronica, 165; Szamosközi István történeti maradványai, 309; Szilágyi, ‘Gyu-
laffi Lestár történeti maradványai’, 202.
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advised him to erect ramparts and hide in the Transylvanian mountains.”58 Basta’s 
letter written in Prázsmár (Prejmer, present-day Romania) on September 30, 1602 
to Filippo Spinelli, papal nuncio in Prague, reveals the outcome of his plan. The letter 
says that Basta sent Tommaso Cavrioli and 500 Walloon riders to aid the voivode of 
Wallachia. Cavrioli was ordered to stay behind the ramparts. Thanks to the efforts 
of the captains Count Carlo de Verlin and Count Camilio Cavrioli, the battle, 
which lasted until sunset, was won. Simion Movilă and the Crimean Tatar Khan 
lost 4–5,000 soldiers, while the Walloons and the Wallachians lost 300 soldiers with 
1,000 injured.59
Basta proved the cunningness mentioned by Bojti Veres (adaptability might be 
a better choice of word) on three occasions against three different adversaries. The 
first occasion was the Battle of Miriszló, when he lured Voivode Michael out of his 
easily defendable position. Prior to the battle the Transylvanian troops defeated a 
small Cossack unit and the victory boosted their morale so that István Csáky, János 
Mikola and some other noblemen implored General Basta to allow them to attack 
Michael the Brave’s army behind the ramparts. According to Szamosközy, Basta 
replied in the negative as follows: 
“…as I see the position of the Voivode has been greatly fortified and we would 
pay a high price should we want to storm his ramparts. Also, it is past the best 
time, as it is getting late. The Voivode is cunning so we must be cunning, too … 
Either the Voivode will retreat during the night or he will oppose and attack us 
come tomorrow. We now should stay put and tomorrow we shall be victorious.”60 
Basta’s advice was taken and the battle was fought the following day. The 
commander, seeing that Michael the Brave had not abandoned his fortifications, 
ordered Csáky to retreat and lure the voivode out of the gorge where he had set up 
camp. Csáky had to attack him once the voivode ventured out.61 The battle ended 
with the complete annihilation of the voivode’s forces, just as Basta had predicted 
based on his insights.
58  “Végezte Radul vajdával, hogy meg ne víjon az tatárokkal, mert ezek mind lengyelek-, moldvaival 
voltak száz ezeren, hanem hogy besánczolja magát az erdélyi havasokhoz.” Kazinczy, Illésházy István 
nádor följegyzései, 111.
59  Kruppa, Erdély és a Szentszék, 116–117.
60  “…a vajda az mint az helynek állapotját látom erős helyen vagyon, nagy kárunkkal vehetjük ki 
onnat. Más az hogy immár el is múlt az ideje, estve felé vagyon. Az vajda igen czigán, azért mi is ravaszak 
legyünk… Az vajda az éjjel vagy elmegyen előttünk, vagy szembe jű holnap velünk és reánk jű. Legyünk 
vesztegsígben, holnap jobb módunk leszen az dologban.” Szamosközi István történeti maradványai, 
124–125; Veress, A miriszlói csata, 10–11.
61  Szamosközi István történeti maradványai, 125; Bethlen, Erdély története, 259–262; Istvánffy 
Magyarok dolgairól írt históriája, 347–348.
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In less than a year’s time the former adversaries became allies and the former allies 
became adversaries facing one another on the hills near Goroszló. Moses Székely, 
one of the leaders of Sigismund Báthory’s army, occupied one of the hills and with 
his cannons kept the forces led by Basta and Michael the Brave under fire. The early 
August heat caused the parties to postpone the battle until the next morning and 
Székely’s soldiers started to pull back their cannons from the ramparts on the hilltop 
and transport them back to the camp. The voivode and Basta saw the opportunity 
and launched an unexpected attack. They stood their soldiers in battle formations 
with the best units sent to occupy the hilltop under Basta’s direction.
“However, Moses left nothing back in what was a sudden and doubtful 
enterprise; and first the infantry with their rifles retook the hilltop and with 
their guns they waited with bravery for our soldiers, who stormed them. And 
they fought hard for a long time and many soldiers lost their lives on both 
sides.”62 
The unrelenting attacks of the imperial-royal troops were finally successful and 
Báthory’s army suffered defeat.63 Considering Basta’s situation awareness and his 
ability to respond quickly to unexpected opportunities, it is understandable why 
Ferenc Mikó Hidvégi opined that Basta defeated Székely and Csáky not by sheer 
force; he outsmarted them.64
The third occasion took place on November 27, 1604 when Basta’s army was 
surrounded by Bocskai’s Hajduks near Edelény, in a narrow valley of the Bükk 
mountains. Máté Sepsi Laczkó recorded that it was once again Basta’s situation 
awareness and military expertise that allowed him to escape from the trap.65 The 
incessant counterattacks of his troops initially failed, but Basta could buy time and 
could identify the weaknesses of Hajduk infantry and cavalry regimens. The next 
dawn Basta took advantage of these weaknesses, broke out of the valley and defeated 
Bocskai’s army.66
62  “Mindazonáltal Mózes semmit hátra nem hagyván abban, ami oly hirtelen és kétséges dologban 
véghezvitethetnék, elsőbben az puskás gyalogok, kik a dombot a lövőszerszámokkal ismét elfoglalták 
vala, a mieinket, kik rájok rohanának, nagy merészen rájok várák, és sokáig erősen harcolának, sokan 
mind a két félben elveszvén.” Istvánffy Magyarok dolgairól írt históriája, 353.
63  Szádeczky, Erdély és Mihály vajda története, 253–254.
64  Kazinczy, Hidvégi Mikó Ferenc históriája, 151.
65  ‘Sepsi Laczkó Máté’, 54.
66  Istvánffy Magyarok dolgairól írt históriája, 442; Nagy, A Bocskai szabadságharc, 132–134. 
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Personal example
Giorgio Basta strove to employ not only his knowledge and expertise in his battles 
and campaigns but like other commanders of the era he also personally participated 
in the fight, showing his soldiers a personal example of bravery.
In the Battle of Miriszló he was the leader of the rearguard when the Transylvanian 
and the imperial-royal army retreated, and he lured Voivode Michael out of his 
fortified position. Later, when the battle began, he set up his company of Walloon 
harquebusiers in front of the battle formation.67 
He also risked his life in the Battle of Goroszló. In a contemporary account of the 
battle, Istvánffy recorded that Basta personally led his troops into battle up the hill 
that the Transylvanians had fortified with ramparts. He was shot in the shoulder but 
his armor deflected the bullet.68
In the Battle of Tövis on July 2, 1604 he may have been wounded. László Kővári 
wrote that in the battle “János Kadácsfalvi inflicted two wounds on the general’s head.”69 
However, a report by Lestár Gyulaffi casts doubt on the incident. He mentions that 
before the battle the general disguised a certain Zamo Jacobus as himself by clothing 
the man in his attire. Therefore, it was the substitute who was injured twice on the 
head and once in the shoulder. Allegedly it was Zamo himself who gave an account 
of the event to a certain István Szoross.70
Basta was willing to risk his life not only when attacking the enemy but on other 
occasions as well. Prior to the Battle of Miriszló, for example, he held the war council 
on horseback in the line of cannon fire.71 In the Battle of Tövis, a huge cannonball 
hit the ground beside him,72 and during the Siege of Kassa (December 1–3, 1604) he 
was almost smashed to death by a projectile aimed at his tent.73
It is also important to note that Basta shared the lot of his soldiers away from the 
battlefield, as demonstrated by the autobiography of Kristóf Lackner. The author 
mentions that when they launched an attack against Gergely Némethy in June 
1605, the general spent the night in a carriage standing in the garden of the castle of 
Keresztúr.74 At the time Basta was aged over 50 and was rather sickly.75
67  ÖStA KA Best. 565/1598; Szádeczky, Erdély és Mihály vajda története, 195, 199; Szádeczky, ‘A 
miriszlói ütközet’, 439; Veress, A miriszlói csata, 11; Bethlen, Erdély története, 262.
68  Istvánffy Magyarok dolgairól írt históriája, 353; Szádeczky, Erdély és Mihály vajda története, 254; 
Gömöry, ‘Adalékok az 1601–1602. évi erdélyi hadi eseményekhez’, 82.
69  “Kadácsfalvi Jánostól fejére két sebet kapott.” Kővári, Erdély történelme, 133.
70  Szilágyi, ‘Gyulaffi Lestár történeti maradványai’, 199.
71  Bălcescu, A románok Vitéz Mihály idején, 389.
72  Gömöry, ‘Adalékok az 1601–1602. évi erdélyi hadi eseményekhez’, 255.
73  Szamosközi István történeti maradványai, 264; Szilágyi, ‘Gyulaffi Lestár történeti maradványai’, 205.
74  Tóth, Lackner Kristófnak, mindkét jog doktorának rövid életrajza, 107.
75  Veress, Basta György levelezése I, XXXIV; Veress, Basta György levelezése II, XXI; Kruppa, Erdély 
és a Szentszék, 113.
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Basta, the military scientist
Giorgio Basta made use of his vast knowledge not solely on the battlefield; he 
considered it important to record and publish his experiences. He wrote in Italian, 
but in the early 17th century his works were published in French and German as 
well. His books counted as the most important sources of military education in the 
era.
He consigned three tractates to posterity, the most important of which is the Il 
governo della cavalleria leggera, or The Government of Light Cavalry76 published in 
Venice in 1612. Two years later the book was published in Frankfurt in German and 
a French translation was issued in Rouen in 1616. 
As for his views on the role of cavalry, Basta was clearly ahead of his time. It 
is essential to understand that the emergence and proliferation of firearms brought 
about a decisive transformation in tactics for both the infantry and the cavalry. The 
vigorous attack of the medieval knights made way for new tactics where the cavalry 
approached enemy lines at a gallop, and the riders fired their pistols or harquebuses 
in a stationary position. Then the cavalry retreated behind the infantry lines in order 
to reload their weapons. This manoeuvre was called caracole.77 This caused the cavalry 
to move awkwardly on the battlefield and to lose other advantages, too.
Based on his own experience, the general strongly believed that the cavalry had 
to retain its mobility. The goal was to make the cavalry the eye of the army, that is, 
they had to be capable of successful reconnaissance. Their tactic was to wear the 
enemy out by constant attacks and assaults and by cutting off supply routes. Basta 
also emphasized that the cavalry had to be in contact and in sync with all other 
military branches. Therefore, it is not surprising that during the Long Turkish War 
commanders attempted to make up for the imperial-royal army’s slowness and lack 
of mobility by engaging the services of Hungarian, Croatian, Polish and Cossack 
riders.78 
The work consists of four major chapters. The first one discusses the recruitment 
of officers and common soldiers. Basta believed that it was their aptitude and 
experience that made a good officer rather than nobility titles. A captain tasked with 
setting up a unit was to have absolute authority over all other officers, but he had to 
discuss his choices with the commissioner or with the representatives thereof. (In 
that era, most high-ranking officers were also military contractors.) A lieutenant, 
in Basta’s view, had to be of mature age, because this would guarantee his authority 
76  In the 16th century all cavalry units were considered “light”, unless they were covered in armour 
from head to toe.
77  Kelenik, ‘A kézi lőfegyverek jelentősége’, 80–122. passim.
78  Nagy, ‘“Megint fölszánt magyar világ van…”’, 209; Szamosközi István történeti maradványai, 271; 
Szilágyi, ‘Gyulaffi Lestár történeti maradványai’, 193.
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over the subordinates. The standard bearers needed to be young people with an 
adventurous spirit and a desire for glory.
Basta devoted particular care to the armament of soldiers. The mounted shooters 
had a blunderbuss they fixed to their backs using a shoulder strap and they also 
carried a short sword suitable for piercing the enemy. Basta recommended that these 
cavalrymen be young and robust, and he considered the Flemish and Walloons to 
be the best rather than the Italians. The most important characteristics for lancers 
were velocity and endurance. They also had to be equipped with a short sword and a 
pistol, which was useful in close-quarters combat.
The second chapter deals with how the army is to march to the battlefield. 
His experience gained in the Netherlands and France and the principles of the 
prince of Alba aided Basta in this chapter where he emphasized the importance of 
reconnaissance as a way of defending the army against the surprise attacks of the 
enemy.
The third chapter lays down the rules of billeting, although Basta stresses that 
he only reiterates the principles set out by Alessandro Farnese, pursuant to which 
a commander is to appoint commissioners whose task is to find and inspect the 
lodgings or quarters for the soldiers. These officers were also responsible for storing 
and distributing the supplies and provisions and were to be assisted by the Furiers.
The final chapter is devoted to the tactical organization of the cavalry on the 
battlefield. Basta recommends the crescent moon, rather than lines, columns or 
groups, because this arrangement allows the maximum utilization of firepower and 
of the momentum of the attack.79
Another important work written by Basta is the Il maestro di campo generale, that 
is The General Field Marshal. It was first published in Venice in 1606, and a year later 
a French translation was issued in Frankfurt. Then, in Oppenheim in 1617, it was 
published in German. Basta divided his work into six parts of various length. The 
first one consists of two chapters and deals with the personality of a general field 
marshal, who, according to Basta, must meet two most important requirements: 
he must fear God and he must be well-versed in the art of war. In Basta’s view, the 
second-in-command (following the colonel general) does not need a deputy.
Basta identified two entities the general field marshal had to control. First, the 
field marshal had to control himself because only in this way could his leadership be 
without transgressions and greed, and only in this way could he set an example for his 
soldiers. Secondly, the general field marshal had to command and control an entire 
79  Basta, Gouuerno della Caualleria. On the illustrations in the book, see Noe, Alfred. ‘Das Ka-
valleriehandbuch von Giorgio Basta d’Hust. Ein illustrativer Umweg in der Rezeption eines Fachtextes 
zu Beginn des 17. Jahrhunderts.’ In Die Bedeutung der Rezeptionsliteratur für Bildung und Kultur der 
Frühen Neuzeit (1400–1750), edited by Alfred Noe and Hans-Gert Roloff. Bern–Wien: Peter Lang, 
2012. 27–45.
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army. Based on his experiences in Hungary and the Netherlands, Basta had in mind 
a multinational army, where all the nations were to retain their own characteristics 
and officers. Therefore, he argued, the general marshal had to know the customs, 
characteristics and language of his soldiers so that he did not need to engage the 
services of an interpreter. Basta thought this was indispensable and necessary because 
of the distribution of provisions. He discussed in a separate chapter how to procure 
and transport provisions into the camp and how to set the prices thereof in order to 
prevent financial speculations.
As for military justice, a general field marshal had rights and powers similar to 
those of a colonel general, although a general field marshal had to communicate 
to his superior any sentence he imposed before it was executed. Also, he had an 
important role in settling disputes between the common soldiers and their officers. 
In the second part of the book Basta treats the third factor a general field marshal 
needs to keep under his control, that is, the duties related to the campaigns. It is 
imperative for a general field marshal to plan out the entire campaign and to make 
arrangements for the necessary armament and provisions. Furthermore, he must 
acquire information about the country and customs of the enemy and the features 
of their warfare. Basta analyses, in nine chapters, the different ways of marching, the 
tasks of the vanguard, the movement of the baggage train and the organization of a 
retreat.
The third part deals with the billeting of the army. In eleven short chapters, Basta 
sets out how to set up encampments and prepare the defensive ramparts. He also 
presents the principles according to which the general field marshal, in collaboration 
with the quartermaster (Quartiermeister), appoints the quarters for the infantry and 
the cavalry.
The fourth part is about sieges. Basta determines what needs to be taken into 
consideration before besieging a fortress. A general field marshal must be aware of 
the strength of the hostile field forces that may relieve the besieged castle; he must 
be familiar with the general state of the castle (strength of the walls, the number, 
provisions and armament of the defenders). A general field marshal must assess the 
benefit his commissioner may gain by occupying the castle; he must decide whether 
or not the sacrifice of provisions and soldiers’ lives will be in vain. Further, Basta 
emphasizes that it is important for a general field marshal to send spies into the 
besieged castle who can inform him of the situation within the walls. Four chapters 
discuss the building of ramparts, trenches and artillery batteries and the protection 
of the builders.
The fifth part focuses on the various types of attack. This part consists of five 
chapters listing all the factors necessary for a general field marshal to order an attack. 
These chapters also cover the necessary weapons and equipment. Basta emphasizes 
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the importance of the shovel and the hoe, since these tools allowed the soldiers to 
erect new ramparts on the newly occupied territories. The general gained first-hand 
experience of the usefulness of these tools when Alessandro Farnese laid siege to 
Maastricht in 1579.
In the final part of his work Basta gives an overview about how to fight battles. 
He argues that a general field marshal must decide whether to seize or turn down 
the opportunity offered by the enemy to engage in battle. A general must consider 
whether to deploy the cavalry, especially if they are outnumbered by the enemy 
cavalry. It is equally important to pay attention to the enemy’s battle formations and 
the position of the baggage train of the general field marshal’s own army.
Five out of the nine chapters of the final part deal with how to fight Ottoman 
forces. Basta advises against engaging them in the open field and believes that the 
order of battle should be established by mixing infantry and cavalry units because 
this is the only way for an army to withstand the attack of an Ottoman cavalry that 
seem to outnumber any other equestrian forces.80
In 1610, three years after Basta’s death, his third work – Del governo dell’artiglieria, 
or The Government of Artillery – was published in Venice. This book, however, was 
generally considered less significant and made a smaller impact on the art of warfare.81
Basta, the politician
Carl von Clausewitz said that war is the continuation of politics by different means.82 
It appears that Basta was keenly aware of this axiom at the turn of the 17th century, 
and his biography reveals that he was much more than a talented commander. He 
received more complicated and delicate tasks from the Habsburg Court and in 
order to successfully complete those, Basta needed the skills of both a diplomat 
and a governor. Before briefly introducing Basta in these two roles, I would like to 
highlight three basic and connecting cornerstones of his policy. The first was his 
fierce loyalty to the emperor. The second was his determined effort to spare and keep 
the strength of his army by evasive manoeuvres if outnumbered or outpowered and 
by maintaining operational readiness through securing sufficient provisions and 
armament. Basta’s pragmatic thinking was the third cornerstone; it often meant 
making promises to those on the enemy side in order to sow dissension among them.
80  Basta, Giorgio. Il maestro di campo generale. Oppenheim: Hoffmann, 1617.
81  Grassi, Giuseppe. Dizionario militare Italiano. Torino: V. Pomba, 1817. XXIII; D’Ayala, Mari-
ano. Dizionario militare Francese Italiano. Napoli: Tip. G. Nobile, 1841. 13; D’Ayala, Mariano. Bibli-
ografia militare – Italiana antica e moderna. Torino: Dalla stamperia reale, 1854. 137.
82  Keegan, A parancsnoklás álarca, 20. [Keegan, The Mask of Command, 4.] 
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Basta, the diplomat
According to John Keegan, a general may be many things besides the commander 
of an army, for he may be a king, priest or diplomat.83 Only a few months after his 
arrival in the Kingdom of Hungary, the general was given a diplomatic task: in 1597 
he participated in peace talks with Serdar Saturji Mohammed. To date I have found 
no information as to whether Basta was an active participant or merely an observer 
in the negotiations. However, it seems certain that it was his good relationship with 
Archduke Maximilian and his high rank in the army rather than his local knowledge 
that allowed him to participate in the talks.84
After Maximilian’s departure he had to play an active and independent political 
role in Upper Hungary and in Transylvania. As Niccolo Machiavelli puts it in The 
Prince, “It is necessary to understand how to set a good colour upon this disposition, 
and to be able to fain and dissemble throughly.”85 Basta’s many years of experience 
prompted him to act in a similar fashion. In the summer and autumn of 1599, he 
considered it too risky to launch a campaign against Transylvania due to financial 
hardships and the proximity of Ottoman forces. Although Basta was aware of the 
intentions of Rudolf II, he sought to come to an agreement with András Báthory 
and treated his envoys with respect.86
One year later, after the Battle of Miriszló, Basta established diplomatic relations 
with Lord Grand-Chancellor Jan Zamoyski, since he did not have an army strong 
enough to defend and keep the newly acquired Transylvania and Wallachia 
for Rudolf II. The Polish grand-chancellor sought to enforce the terms of the 
agreement concluded with the High Porte in 1598, and wanted to take possession of 
Transylvania, Wallachia and Moldavia.87 That was why Sigismund Báthory wanted 
to seize the throne of Transylvania with the aid of Poland in January 1600.88 Besides, 
Zamoyski planned to punish Michael the Brave for having interfered with the affairs 
of Moldavia, which was traditionally regarded as part of the Polish sphere of interest. 
Zamoyski ordered Jan Potocki, Viovode of Bracław, to seek out Michael the 
Brave wherever he might be and annihilate his army.89 After their first exchange of 
83  Keegan, A parancsnoklás álarca, 12. [Keegan, The Mask of Command, 1.]
84  Istvánffy Magyarok dolgairól írt históriája, 285.
85  “Fontos, hogy a fejedelem leplezni tudja valódi természetét, hogy tökéletesen értsen a tettetéshez 
és az alakoskodáshoz.” Machiavelli, Niccolo. A fejedelem. Budapest: Kossuth, 1991. 74. [Translator’s 
note: The English language version used for the purpose of translation: Machiavelli, Nicholas, The Art 
of War & The Prince, London: David Nutt, 1905. 322.]
86  Bethlen, Erdély története, 127; Bălcescu, A románok Vitéz Mihály idején, 246; Istvánffy Magyarok 
dolgairól írt históriája, 319.
87  Horn, Báthory András, 199.
88  ÖNB Cod. No. 8973. 16r, 19r.
89  Bethlen, Erdély története, 269.
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letters, Basta and the representatives of the Transylvanian estates decided to send 
István Csáky to Wallachia to negotiate with Zamoyski and Sigismund Báthory. They 
had to beg and make considerable promises to Csáky. Only after Basta offered him 
the castles of Sáros and Szádvár as a reward on behalf of the emperor, did Csáky agree 
to undertake the mission. Finally, he persuaded Zamoyski and Sigismund Báthory to 
refrain from invading Transylvania with their army.90
However, his success in fending off Polish aspirations proved to be temporary: at the 
Diet of Kolozsvár in the spring of 1601, as a result of Csáky’s clandestine operations, the 
representatives of the estates elected Sigismund Báthory their prince. Although Basta 
defeated their army at Boroszló, he had no money or soldiers to recapture Transylvania. 
The parties declared a ceasefire preserving the status quo, but Sigismund was inclined 
to surrender Transylvania, so the Habsburg Court ordered Basta, who had retreated to 
Szatmár county, to start negotiations with the prince. During the talks, Basta espoused 
the cause of Radu Şerban, the Wallachian pretender.91 
Basta once again approached Csáky and promised to pay him 80,000 Forints 
if Csáky could persuade the Prince to renounce the throne. The venal lord made 
Báthory relinquish his principality, and this unexpected move sparked outrage 
among his supporters who took up arms to fight Basta and his invading forces. The 
general promised they would be granted mercy by the emperor in an attempt to 
dissuade these noblemen from armed conflict, but his efforts were to no avail. After 
the bloody Battle of Tövis, Sigismund and the majority of his surviving followers 
pledged allegiance to Rudolf II, while Moses Székely, leader of the resistance, fled to 
the Ottoman Empire.92
When, however, Basta felt his forces were sufficient to win a battle, he always 
refused to settle the conflict through negotiation. The night before the Battle of 
Miriszló Michael the Brave sent his envoy to the encampment of Basta and the 
Transylvanians and in his letter, he begged them to peacefully resolve their conflict 
90  Bethlen, Erdély története, 272–273; Istvánffy Magyarok dolgairól írt históriája, 340–341; Krup-
pa, Erdély és a Szentszék, 93–94.
91  Szilágyi, Erdélyország története, 30–31; Veress, Basta György levelezése II, 8–10; Tóth, 
A mezőkeresztesi csata és a tizenöt éves háború, 419.
92  Dilich, Ungarische Chronica, 341–342; Krauss, ‘Tractatus Rerum tam Bellicarum’, 181–182; Bor-
dan, ‘Virtus Coronata’, 225–233; ‘Maros-vásárhelyi Nagy Szabó Ferencz memoriáléja.’ 62–68; ‘Egyedi 
Pál énekéből az erdélyi veszedelmekről.’ 188–210; ‘Sepsi Laczkó Máté,’ 40; Kővári, Erdély történelme, 
123–133; Kazinczy, Hidvégi Mikó Ferenc históriája, 154–155; Szilágyi, Erdélyország története, 25–32; 
Horváth, Magyarország történelme 4, 477–479; Szamosközi István történeti maradványai, 137–172; 
Gömöry, ‘Adalékok az 1601–1602. évi erdélyi hadi eseményekhez’, 243; Acsády, Magyarország három 
részre oszlásának története, 559; Veress, Basta György levelezése I, XLIII–XLV, 666–721; Bojti Veres, 
‘A nagy Bethlen Gábor viselt dolgairól’, 28; Újváry, “Nagy két császár birodalmi között”, 81; Tóth, A 
mezőkeresztesi csata és a tizenöt éves háború, 416–417; Ortelius, Chronologia oder Historische Beschrei-
bung aller Kriegsempörungen und Belagerungen in Ungarn, 213r–223r.; Istvánffy Magyarok dolgairól írt 
históriája, 389–394, 405; Kruppa, Erdély és a Szentszék, 93–111, passim.
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and launch a joint attack against Temesvár. The envoy’s request, however, failed to 
affect Basta and his follower noblemen, because they “were all too familiar with the 
smooth talking and double tongue of the Voivode.”93
Basta had to acquire the supplies necessary to keep the army operational. In order 
to maintain the strength and combat readiness of his army, Basta always made sure 
to provide the soldiers with all necessary supplies – which he seized either through 
negotiation or by sheer force. For instance, in December 1604 he was forced to enter 
into negotiations with the leaders of Eperjes, a free royal town that had come to 
support Bocskai. Following the battles of Osgyán and Edelény and the unsuccessful 
Siege of Kassa, he chose to stay with his soldiers and made a demand for winter 
quarters and supplies in Eperjes. The magistracy of Eperjes refused to comply. 
However, the imperial-royal army 
“set up camp on the outskirts of the town for three days, waiting for further 
notice. In the meantime, Eperjes reported the events to the other four free royal 
cities;94 therefore their representatives congregated and discussed how they 
could prevent trouble and further damage to the cities. They loyally negotiated 
with the honourable lords and concluded that Lord Basta should promise on 
behalf of His Majesty to let them follow their Lutheran faith and to guarantee 
their liberties and not to provoke hostilities. To the proposition of the cities Lord 
Basta took an oath on the blood of Christ to keep his promises. When he had 
made his promise, he was allowed to enter the city of Eperjes, and his entire 
army was stationed in the houses of the noblemen and in the surrounding 
villages.”95
It is important to note that the leaders of the city made a pragmatic decision, 
since Basta’s two victories significantly changed the war situation. Thus, the leaders 
considered that it was safer to side with Rudolf II, although they imposed certain 
conditions.
93  “Jól ismerték a már a vajda sima beszédét és kétszínűségét.” Bethlen, Erdély története, 260; Szá-
deczky, Erdély és Mihály vajda története, 195; Bălcescu, A románok Vitéz Mihály idején, 386.
94  The towns of the Pentapolitana: Kassa, Lőcse, Bártfa, Kisszeben and Eperjes (Košice, Levoča, 
Bardejov, Sabinov, Prešov; present-day Slovakia).
95  “Három napig a külvárosban táborozott, további értesülésre várva. Közben Eperjes jelentést tett 
a másik négy szabad városnak, és ezért gyűlést tartottak, s azon tanakodtak, hogy előzhetnék meg a bajt 
s a szegény városok szegény károsodását. Hűségesen megtanácskozták előkelő urakkal, s arra jutottak, 
hogy Básta úr ő királyi felsége nevében ígérje meg ezeknek a városoknak, hogy meghagyja őket ágostai 
[evangélikus] hitükben, és szabadságaikat biztosítja, s nem szít ellenségeskedést. A városoknak arra a 
javaslatára Básta úr esküvel megfogadta nekik, hogy mindezt Krisztus vérére megtartja. Erre a nyilat-
kozatra beengedték Eperjes városába, az egész tábor pedig beszállásolta magát a nemesi udvarokba és a 
falvakba.” Hain, Szepességi avagy lőcsei krónika, 128–129.
giorgio Basta: a short summary of a Career 59
Basta, the governor
When Basta arrived in the Kingdom of Hungary, he was experienced not only in 
military affairs but also in the matters of governance, since the king of Spain had 
appointed him the governor of Geldern province in the Low Countries. Basta 
therefore was aware of how to govern an area in a time of war while ensuring the best 
possible provisions for his army.96
Following the defeat of András Báthory, the Hungarian landlords of Transylvania 
urged Rudolf II in the autumn of 1600 to appoint a respectable person as the 
governor of Transylvania. They also warned the emperor to hurry, since Voivode 
Michael the Brave had already assumed the title of governor and regent and donated 
lands on his own in Transylvania, convened the Diet and striven to occupy castles 
in eastern Hungary. What is more he had made the estates of Transylvania swear 
allegiance not only to Rudolf II, but also to himself and to his own son. 
The Court then consulted Basta and requested his advice on how to settle the 
Transylvanian affairs. The general set out the rights and obligations of the future 
governor. He believed that the governor and the twelve counsellors aiding him had 
to swear allegiance to Rudolf II, and the governor was to issue a promissory note 
that he would not establish contact with the Ottoman Empire, nor would he fight 
as an ally of the Ottomans. As a token of recognizing the authority of the emperor, 
the governor had to pay tax to the Habsburgs and had to offer the major part of his 
revenue to construct and equip castles all over the country. All the patents given to 
the Transylvanian Saxons and cities were to remain valid. The fortresses in Partium 
under the control of Transylvania were to remain in the hands of the emperor, who 
also retained control over financial matters and mines.97
Basta could put his ideas into practice after the Battle of Miriszló. At the Diet 
of Lécfalva (Leț, present-day Romania) (October 25–November 4, 1600) two 
leaders were appointed to the newly established Governing Council: István Csáky 
represented the estates of Transylvania, while Basta acted on behalf of the emperor. 
The estates of Transylvania clearly understood that this transitory period was not 
sustainable in the long run, so they sent envoys to Prague and appealed to Rudolf 
II for the appointment of a Habsburg archduke (Maximilian) as the head of state. 
Alternatively, they requested the right to freely elect a prince. When neither of these 
requests were granted, Basta’s political capital rapidly diminished. 
The general abandoned the Machiavellian principles and instead of resorting to 
sheer brutality,98 he made political gestures to win the favour of the Transylvanian 
estates. In spite of the emperor’s disapproval, Basta, for example, dismissed his 
96  Veress, Basta György levelezése I, XXXI.
97  Szádeczky, Erdély és Mihály vajda története, 110–112.
98  Machiavelli, A fejedelem, 70.
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soldiers.99 This measure, however, further complicated his position, because the 
estates in Transylvania believed that Sigismund Báthory and his supporter, Jan 
Zamoyski, would grant them the protection against the return of Voivode Michael 
or another Ottoman attack. Still, over time, Basta appeared in a more favourable 
light and in February 1601, at the Diet of Kolozsvár, the participants offered him the 
castle of Déva if he promised to stay in Transylvania and to come over to Báthory’s 
side. Basta, however, honoured his oath of allegiance to the Habsburgs and turned 
down the offer.100 In the aftermath of the Battle of Tövis, Basta once again chose not 
to govern the country in the Machiavellian fashion. He made political gestures to 
win the loyalty of the Transylvanian estates for the Habsburgs,101 but later he decided 
to abandon this policy and in 1603 he switched to violent methods. 
Although the Transylvanians pledged loyalty to Rudolf II at the Diet of January 
19, 1603, the pillaging of the Habsburg soldiers and the famine that arose following 
a poor harvest deepened the abyss between Basta and the estates of Transylvania. The 
representatives of the estates sent a letter to Rudolf II with their administrative and 
legal demands. Basta responded by practically suspending the feudal constitution. 
On February 24, 1603 he and two of his fellow commissioners drafted a proposition 
on how to govern Transylvania. They addressed the document to Rudolf II and 
proposed to introduce a new administration by appointing a governor and an 
eight-member Lieutenancy Council; the liberties of the counties, towns and other 
self-governing units were to be abolished; the Diet was to be eliminated and the 
Governors Grand Council were to function as the legislative body. The authors also 
proposed to set up a permanent Chancellery and invite German settlers, craftsmen 
and miners to Transylvania.102
After Voivode Radu’s victory at Brassó, Basta remained the governor for another 
nine months, during which time he had many high-ranking officials of the public 
administration executed and terrorized the Transylvanian estates. Having broken 
down the resistance, Basta set out to organize the Habsburg administration of 
Transylvania.103
99  Kálmán Benda in his work on Bocskai writes that Basta had already suspended the constitution 
of the country and he governed more ruthlessly than Voivode Michael, because he considered the Hun-
garians to be his enemies. Benda, Bocskai István, 90–91.
100 ‘Maros-vásárhelyi Nagy Szabó Ferencz memoriáléja.’ 59; Kővári, Erdély történelme, 116; 
Kazinczy, Hidvégi Mikó Ferenc históriája, 150; Gömöry, ‘Adalékok az 1601–1602. évi erdélyi hadi ese-
ményekhez’, 68; Erdélyt és Magyarországot érintő iratok 1601–1605. Jezsuita Okmánytár I/1–2, edited 
by Mihály Balázs et al. Szeged: JATE, 1995. 18–21; Ortelius, Chronologia oder Historische Beschreibung 
aller Kriegsempörungen und Belagerungen in Ungarn, 196v; Kruppa, Erdély és a Szentszék, 88.
101 Kővári, Erdély történelme, 135; Szilágyi, Erdélyország története, 31; Kruppa, Erdély és a 
 Szentszék, 113.
102 Szilágyi, Erdélyország története, 33–34; Veress, Basta György hadvezér 1603-iki főjelentése.
103 ‘Maros-vásárhelyi Nagy Szabó Ferencz memoriáléja.’ 84–91; Kővári, Erdély történelme, 152–
158; Szilágyi, Erdélyország története, 42–46; Acsády, Magyarország három részre oszlásának története, 
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When discussing Basta’s modus operandi as governor, one may not ignore the 
assassination of Michael the Brave, voivode of Wallachia. Based on what he had 
experienced in the Habsburg Netherlands, Basta regarded political murder as a 
conventional method to resolve political impasses. One such instance was when 
Balthasar Gérard, a fanatic Catholic shot William I, Prince of Orange, on July 10, 
1584 in Delft. After the assassination, Basta was a member of the squad sent to 
apprehend the perpetrator in October 1584. 
Basta therefore believed that political murder was a way to resolve conflicts in 
the intricate Transylvanian affairs, and in the Prague Court of the Habsburgs he 
also raised the possibility of assassinating István Bocskai, too. The emperor did not 
object to the idea, but then decided not to follow through, since Bocskai was famous 
for being cautious.104 What necessitated the assassination of Michael the Brave was 
that the voivode had been a turncoat and his ambitions posed a real threat to the 
Habsburg rule in Transylvania. In his case Basta made no effort to keep up pretence: 
he simply sent his Walloons into the tent of the victim and then had his severed head 
carried around in the Torda encampment.105
Perception of Giorgio Basta in Hungarian historiography
If there was a contest to identify the most hated figures of Hungarian history, Basta 
would certainly be among the finalists. As László Kővári put it in his work published 
in 1860, “it has been two and a half centuries since the events, but the name of Basta 
and the era in which he ruled still evoke bloodcurdling memories in our soul.”106 Basta’s 
561–564; Szamosközy, Erdély története, 458–477; Szilágyi, ‘Gyulaffi Lestár történeti maradványai’, 
223; Veress, Basta György hadvezér 1603-iki főjelentése; Istvánffy Magyarok dolgairól írt históriája, 409–
410; Kruppa, Tamás. ‘Miksa főherceg erdélyi kormányzóságának terve. Az erdélyi Habsburg-kormány-
zat felállításának kérdéséhez.’ Századok 145, no. 4 (2011): 817–846, 838.
104  Benda, Bocskai István, 93–94; G. Etényi, Nóra et al. Koronás fejedelem, Bocskai István és kora. 
Budapest: General Press, 2006. 148.
105  Dilich, Ungarische Chronica, 333–334; Pethő, Rövid magyar kronica, 150; Krauss, ‘Tractatus 
Rerum tam Bellicarum’, 168–171; Bordan, ‘Virtus Coronata’, 224; Hatvani, Magyar történelmi ok-
mánytár, 154; ‘Maros-vásárhelyi Nagy Szabó Ferencz memoriáléja.’ 59–61; ‘Egyedi Pál énekéből az 
erdélyi veszedelmekről.’ 185; ‘Sepsi Laczkó Máté’, 38–39; Kővári, Erdély történelme, 113–122; Ka-
zinczy, Illésházy István nádor följegyzései, 81–94; Kazinczy, Hidvégi Mikó Ferenc históriája, 149–151; 
Szilágyi, Erdélyország története, 21–23; Horváth, Magyarország történelme 4, 475; Szamosközi István 
történeti maradványai, 132–136; Szádeczky, Erdély és Mihály vajda története, 218–266; Szilágyi, ‘Gyu-
laffi Lestár történeti maradványai’, 132; Acsády, Magyarország három részre oszlásának története, 555–
558; Benda, ‘Giovanni Marco Isolano gróf ezredes feljegyzése’, 672–673; Újváry, “Nagy két császár 
birodalmi között”, 80; Benda, Bocskai István, 90–98; Ortelius, Chronologia oder Historische Beschrei-
bung aller Kriegsempörungen und Belagerungen in Ungarn, 199v–200r.; Istvánffy Magyarok dolgairól 
írt históriája, 350–355; Kruppa, Erdély és a Szentszék, 90–93.
106  “Harmadfél százada az eseményeknek, mégis a Basta név s a Bastakor fogalma, vérfagylaló em-
lékezetet kelt lelkünkben.” Kővári, Erdély történelme, 120.
Zoltán Péter Bagi62
contemporary historiographers and historians in later periods considered Basta’s 
actions harmful for two main reasons. Firstly, they blamed him for allowing the 
Walloons and the Hungarian Hajduks to raid and pillage the country that had turned 
into a theatre of war. Secondly, he was held responsible for the havoc stemming 
from poor harvests, the destruction of productive forces (as clearly indicated by the 
concept of ‘Basta’s carriage’107), the rising of food prices, and, ultimately, cannibalism.
István Szamosközy identified eight events or series of events that led to the 
ultimate devastation of Transylvania beginning from the victory of Voivode Michael 
the Brave at Sellenberk to the defeat of Moses Székely. In four of the accounts the 
author referred to the plundering of Basta’s Hajduks.108 However, Szamosközy did 
not mention the atrocities that had taken place after the surrender of Beszterce, 
even though Istvánffy, Dilich, Ortelius and Isolano and several Transylvanian 
historiographers recorded those terrible deeds in their works or memoirs.109 
Owing to the atrocities described in the above-mentioned sources, Hungarian 
positivist historiographers formulated a rather negative opinion about Basta. Kővári 
wrote that Basta’s ferocious personality was accompanied by an equally ferocious 
appearance;110 to execute the outrages, he brought an army of fierce Walloons who 
hated all Protestants. 
“But six thousand Walloons were not sufficient; domestic Walloons were also 
in need, so, as Basta used to say, they could have one breed of dogs tear at the 
other.”111 
As Mihály Horváth puts it, “He [i.e. Basta], and his army were evil in their ways, 
turning their fury mainly on those supporting Sigismund Báthory and his cause.”112 
At the end of the 19th century Gusztáv Gömöry, the most productive military 
historian of the era, referred to reports published in the Fuggerzeitung and noted 
that Basta also resorted to violence when keeping his own soldiers in line. He severely 
107  Szilágyi, Erdélyország története, 32, 45; Benda, Bocskai István, 101.
108  Szamosközi István történeti maradványai, 101–103.
109  Dilich, Ungarische Chronica, 340; Krauss, ‘Tractatus Rerum tam Bellicarum’, 179–180; ‘Ma-
ros-vásárhelyi Nagy Szabó Ferencz memoriáléja.’ 66; ‘Egyedi Pál énekéből az erdélyi veszedelmekről.’ 
186–187; Kővári, Erdély történelme, 142; Kazinczy, Hidvégi Mikó Ferenc históriája, 153; Szamosközi 
István történeti maradványai, 140, 163; Benda, ‘Giovanni Marco Isolano gróf ezredes feljegyzése’, 
676; Nagy, Magyar História, 355–357; Ortelius, Chronologia oder Historische Beschreibung aller 
Kriegsempörungen und Belagerungen in Ungarn, 216r–217r.; Istvánffy Magyarok dolgairól írt históriá-
ja, 389–390.
110  Kővári, Erdély történelme, 120; Bălcescu, A románok Vitéz Mihály idején, 315–316.
111  “Azonban hatezer vallon nem volt elég, belföldi vallonokat is kelle teremteni, hogy mint Basta 
is mondani szokta vala, az ebet ebbel marassák.” Kővári, Erdély történelme, 120.
112  “Mind hadai gonoszul gazdálkodának, kivált azok ellen fordítván dühüket, a kik Báthory Zsig-
mond pártjára álltak vala.” Horváth, Magyarország történelme 4, 477.
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punished his soldiers when they were caught robbing from locals near Beszterce. He 
had nine Walloons and one soldier from Pezzen’s regiment decapitated, and another 
Walloon, who had attempted to shoot him, quartered. Also, several other ruffians 
were caught, whom Basta ordered to be decapitated or hanged. On one occasion, 
30 naked women were recovered in his soldiers’ barracks, who were all freed. One 
Fähnrich of the above-mentioned regiment was found to be in possession of 6,000 
thalers worth of goods. The goods were returned to their owner and then the officer 
was executed.113
Hungarian historiographers blamed Basta for violating the rights of the 
Transylvanian estates. As János Keserűi Dajka puts it in his work praising Gábor 
Bethlen, 
“after many ordeals, and after Giorgio Basta subjugated Transylvania and 
imposed unspeakable tyranny, he devoted all his powers to eradicate our and the 
homeland’s liberties and then he initiated a gruesome religious persecution.”114 
In his work on the history of Transylvania, Kővári likened Basta to Roman 
Emperor Nero because of the events at the Diet of Medgyes (Mediaș, present-day 
Romania).115 In his work published a few years later, Sándor Szilágyi wrote that the 
governance of Basta was “both heartless and helpless, tyrannical and cowardly at the 
same time.”116 Mihály Horváth did not spare the negative attributes when describing 
the period of Basta’s governance: “After this, Transylvania suffered even more bitterly 
from the tyrannical despotism of this ruthless man.”117
Henrik Marczali, in his historiography of Transylvania published in 1935, 
called Basta a tiger, emphasizing his bloodthirsty nature and referring to the actions 
of his soldiers or to Basta’s political activity.118 Kálmán Benda did the same in his 
monograph written about István Bocskai.119
These works reprimanding Basta and his deeds were followed by other 
interpretations in the first half of the 20th century that applied rational rather than 
113  Gömöry, ‘Adalékok az 1601–1602. évi erdélyi hadi eseményekhez’, 252; Szamosközi István 
történeti maradványai, 141.
114  “Sok csapás után, miután Basta György Erdélyt leigázva mérhetetlen zsarnokságot gyakorolt, s 
a haza és a mi szabadságunkat teljes erejével ki akarta irtani, majd borzalmas vallásüldözést rendezett.” 
A fejedelem: 1613–1629. Keserűi Dajka János … írásaiból. Bevezette Makkai, László. Budapest: Frank-
lin, 1942. 14.
115  Kővári, Erdély történelme, 153.
116  “Szívtelen és tehetetlen volt egyszerre, zsarnoki és gyáva ugyanazon időben.” Szilágyi, Erdély-
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emotional approaches in their efforts to shed light on the general’s personality. 
Endre Veress compiled Basta’s biography with commendable impartiality in the 
introduction of his two-volume diplomatic history. He neither glorifies Basta nor 
compares him to Nero. Like Gömöry, Veress also points out that Basta strove to 
control his soldiers and punished them if they failed to obey him. Veress argues that 
what transpired at the 1603 Diet of Medgyes was also not the result of personal 
vengeance; what is more, he successfully proves with sources published in his work 
that the general carried out the secret orders of the Court.120 
Gyula Szekfű, who was beyond doubt the most eminent Hungarian historian 
in the first half of the 20th century, also provides an objective representation of 
Basta and discards the tenet according to which Basta was a genuinely evil person 
who hated all Hungarians. Szekfű believes that it was the Habsburg archdukes who 
transformed Basta’s goodwill towards the Hungarians into antipathy.121
László Nagy ventured even further in the 1980s by actually arguing in favour of 
Basta. It would be unjust, says Nagy, to make the general primarily and personally 
responsible for the truly grave conditions in Transylvania.122 He dismissed the 
long-standing idea that Basta had not only refused to crack down on the atrocities 
committed by his soldiers but instead encouraged those in order to “break the 
resistance of the Hungarian nobility against Habsburg rule.”123 Nagy, who is a military 
historian, pointed out that had Basta allowed his soldiers to raid and pillage the 
villages, he would have risked losing the supply or provisions of his army and his own 
capability of maintaining discipline. He relies on Ferenc Szabó Nagy’s memoirs and 
on the documents collected by Veress in order to prove his claims. He also mentions 
that in order to protect the country’s wealth, Basta attempted on more than one 
occasion to remove his Hajduks and Walloons from Transylvania.124
László Nagy also poses the question whether the Principality of Transylvania 
or the Kingdom of Hungary made bigger sacrifices in the Long Turkish War? He 
thinks that the Transylvanians who had had no chance to get accustomed to warfare 
“felt that their sacrifice was graver, harder to bear and therefore they were more resentful 
than people living in the Kingdom of Hungary.”125 Zsuzsanna Újváry shared similar 
sentiments in her work published in 1984. Further, she emphasized that considering 
120  Veress, Basta György levelezése I–II; Tóth, A mezőkeresztesi csata és a tizenöt éves háború, 425.
121  Szekfű, Gyula. Magyar történet. IV. kötet. Budapest: Királyi Magyar Egyetemi Nyomda, 1928. 
360.
122  Nagy, László. ‘Erdély és a tizenöt éves háború.’ Századok 116, no. 4 (1982): 639–688, 673.
123  “Ezzel akarván megtörni a magyar nemességnek a Habsburg-kormányzattal szembeni el-
lenállását.” Nagy, László. Hajdúvitézek. Budapest: Kossuth, 1986. 147.
124  Nagy, Hajdúvitézek, 147–148.
125  “Súlyosabbnak érezték, nehezebben viselték el és jobban sérelmezték azokat, mint a magyar-
országiak.” Nagy, ‘Erdély és a tizenöt éves háború.’ 673–674.
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its size, Transylvania had far too big an army to feed and this factor inflicted more 
damage on the Principality than on the larger and richer Kingdom of Hungary.126
A book by Ildikó Horn, Nóra G. Etényi and Péter Szabó on István Bocskai 
examined Basta’s actions from a new perspective and offered a new explanation. 
According to the authors “Basta ran amok in Transylvania not only because of his 
cruel nature but also out of financial considerations.”127 The treasury could not pay his 
soldiers, and therefore he spent 80,000 gold coins from his private fortune to cover 
the expenses of the Transylvanian actions. Consequently, the emperor donated the 
castle of Huszt and the surrounding estates to him. In order to keep his property, 
Basta had to rule Transylvania. That is, by invading Transylvania again and again, the 
general merely protected his own investment and wanted to retrieve his money by 
blackmailing noblemen and plundering the towns.
Conclusion
At the turn of the 17th century, Giorgio Basta was one of best soldiers in the 
Hungarian and Transylvanian theatres in the Long Turkish War against the 
Ottoman Empire. Basta built his career from the bottom up and studiously wrote 
down his experiences. His works were published posthumously and became the 
most authoritative manuals on military science in the 17th century. 
Yet, Basta has been remembered in history as a ruthless and brutal governor 
of Transylvania. This image will most probably remain unchanged until his life 
and career are analysed from new angles that allow a more nuanced and detailed 
interpretation of Basta’s personality and achievements in a European context.
126  Újváry, “Nagy két császár birodalmi között”, 86.
127  “A generális erdélyi ámokfutását nem pusztán kegyetlen természete, hanem anyagi megfon-
tolások is vezették.” G. Etényi et al., Koronás fejedelem, 156.
1“These were hard times for Skanderbeg,  
but he had an ally,  
the Hungarian Hunyadi”
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